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I. JURISDICTION 
The court of appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)G). 
II. ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
ISSUE 1: The trial court acted well within its discretion when it struck Tod's 
Travel Center's and John P. Trout's complaint and answer to counter-claim and 
entered default judgment in favor of Jenkins Oil. 
This is a collection case. Jenkins Oil delivered gasoline to Tod's Travel Center, a 
Panguitch, Utah gas station. Tod's did not pay. Trout personally guaranteed Tod's 
payment for the gas. 
Under Rules 16(d) and 37(b)(2)(C), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a judge may 
strike the pleadings of, or impose a default judgment against, any party that is 
substantially unprepared to participate in a pretrial conference or that participates in bad 
faith. On three separate occasions prior to the May 23, 2002 pretrial conference, the 
attorney representing Trout and the Travel Center withdrew as plaintiffs' counsel on the 
eve of trial. After each withdrawal, plaintiffs' new attorney spent several months 
reviewing the record and preparing plaintiffs' case, delaying trial year after year. 
Frustrated by plaintiffs' persistent dilatory tactics, the trial court warned plaintiffs 
in November, 2001 they would face sanctions, including possibly striking their complaint 
and the entry of default judgment against them, if they were thereafter unprepared to 
participate in the trial process or if they again fired their attorney. (R. 513-14) Despite 
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this warning, plaintiffs refused to provide Jenkins Oil with lists of exhibits or witnesses to 
help prepare a pretrial order for the May, 2002 pretrial conference, and plaintiffs fired 
their fourth attorney on May 22, 2002. Accordingly, the trial court struck plaintiffs' 
complaint and answer to Jenkins Oil's counter-claim, and entered default judgment 
against plaintiffs for $301,769.82. (R. 800) Plaintiffs' disobedience to Judge Mower's 
instructions, their years of willful dilatory conduct, and the Rules of Civil Procedure 
themselves show Judge Mower acted well within his discretion. 
In their brief, Trout and the Travel Center did not indicate how they preserved this 
issue for appeal, as required by Rule 24(a)(5), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
Therefore, Jenkins Oil independently reviewed the record and determined the issue was 
preserved by plaintiffs' motion to set aside the default judgment. (R. 947-953) 
A trial court's decision to impose Rule 37(b)(2)(C) sanctions is reviewed under an 
abuse of discretion standard. Preston & Chambers, P.C. v. Roller, 943 P.2d 260, 262 
(Utah Ct. App. 1997). Appellate courts "will only conclude the trial court abused its 
discretion if the ruling was beyond the limits of reasonability." Tolman v. Winchester 
Hills Co., Inc., 912 P.2d 457, 462 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (internal quotation omitted). See 
also State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936-39 (Utah 1994). 
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ISSUE 2: Judge Mower complied with Utah's Code of Judicial Conduct 
when he presided over the case even if he had previously represented one of the 
plaintiffs. 
The Travel Center and Trout assert Judge Mower should have recused himself 
because Judge Mower allegedly represented one of the plaintiffs in a civil matter before 
his judicial appointment. This representation, they allege, created a "relationship [that] 
left Judge Mower privy to personal details and a personal relationship that reasonably 
could have affected his decisions in this lawsuit." (Appellants' Br. at 3, % 2.) 
As with the first issue, the Travel Center and Trout do not indicate where they 
preserved this issue for appeal. Although Jenkins Oil reviewed every pleading the 
plaintiffs filed since the original March, 1997 complaint, it could not determine where 
plaintiffs preserved, by affidavit, motion, or otherwise, the issue of Judge Mower's 
alleged bias. Because Utah courts "observe the 'general rule that issues not raised at trial 
cannot be argued for the first time on appeal[,]'" this Court should summarily decline to 
address this issue. Diversified Holdings, L.C. v. Turner. 2002 UT 129, f 8, 63 P.3d 686 
(quoting Monson v. Carver, 928 P.2d 1017, 1022 (Utah 1996)). See also Taghipour v. 
Jerez. 2001 UT App 139, 1 18, 26 P.3d 885; Ellis v. Swensen. 2000 UT 101, <fl 30, 16 
P.3d 1233; State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74,111,10 P.3d 346. 
Even though the Travel Center and Trout apparently did not preserve this issue for 
appeal, Jenkins Oil will respond on the merits as best it can. "Determining whether a trial 
judge committed error by failing to recuse himself or herself under the Utah Code of 
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Judicial Conduct.. .and our accompanying case law is a question of law, and [appellate 
courts] review such questions for correctness." State v. Alonzo. 973 P.2d 975, 979 (Utah 
1998). See also State v. Tueller. 2001 UT App 317. 1 7. 37 P.3d 1180. Rule 63(b), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, requires "the party asserting bias to file an affidavit that shall 
state the facts and the reasons for the belief that such bias or prejudice exists." State in 
the Interest of M.U 965 P.2d 551, 556 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). "Utah cases have 
consistently required that the basis alleged in the affidavit have some basis in fact and be 
grounded on more than mere conjecture and speculation." Id 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES 
AND REGULATIONS DETERMINATIVE OR OF CENTRAL 
IMPORTANCE TO THE APPEAL 
1. Rule 16(d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Pretrial conferences, scheduling, and management conferences: Sanctions 
If a party or a party's attorney fails to obey a scheduling or pretrial order, if 
no appearance is made on behalf of a party at a scheduling or pretrial 
conference, if a party or a party's attorney is substantially unprepared to 
participate in the conference, or if a party or a party's attorney fails to 
participate in good faith, the court, upon motion or its own initiative, may 
make such orders with regard thereto as are just, and among others, any of 
the orders in Rule 37(b)(2)(B), (C), (D). In lieu of or in addition to any 
other sanctions, the court shall require the party or the attorney representing 
that party or both to pay the reasonable expenses incurred because of any 
noncompliance with this rule, including attorney fees, unless the court finds 
that the noncompliance was substantially justified or that other 
circumstances make an award of expenses unjust. 
Rule 16(d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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2. Rule 37(b)(2)(C). Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Failure to make or cooperate in discovery; Sanctions 
by court in which action is pending 
[I]f a party fails to obey an order entered under Rule 16(b), the court in 
which the action is pending may make such orders in regard to the failure as 
are just, and among others make the following: 
(C) an order striking out the pleadings or parts thereof,... 
dismissing the action or proceeding or any part thereof, or 
rendering a judgment by default against the disobedient 
party[.] 
Rule 37(b)(2)(C), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
3. Utah Code of Judicial Conduct Canon, 3E(l)(a) 
Disqualification 
A judge shall enter a disqualification in a proceeding in which the judge's 
impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to 
instances where: 
(a) the judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a 
party or a party's lawyer, a strong personal bias involving an 
issue in a case, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary 
facts concerning the proceeding[.] 
Utah Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3E(l)(a). 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below 
This is a collections dispute between a petroleum products supplier, Jenkins Oil 
Co., Inc. ("Jenkins Oil"), and its customers Tod's Travel Center, Inc. ("the Travel 
Center") and personal guarantor John P. Trout ("Trout"). The Travel Center's and 
Trout's March, 1997 complaint alleged breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant 
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of good faith and fair dealing, and fraud, among other claims. (R. 1-33) Jenkins Oil 
counterclaimed for the money it was owed. (R. 68-76) 
After five years of pretrial proceedings, including four withdrawals by plaintiffs' 
attorneys, three notices of intent to dismiss for failure to prosecute, and three unsuccessful 
pretrial conferences, Judge Mower, dismissed the Travel Center's and Trout's complaint 
on June 6, 2002. (R. 800) Judge Mower also struck plaintiffs' answer to Jenkins Oil's 
counterclaim, and entered default judgment in favor of Jenkins Oil for $301,769.82, 
including principal, interest, attorney's fees, and costs. (Id.) 
2. Statement of Facts 
A. The Travel Center and Jenkins Oil's Pre-Lawsuit Dealings; Trout 
Signs a Personal Guarantee of Payment 
In 1990, Trout owned Tod's Travel Center, Inc., a gasoline retailer located in 
Panguitch, Utah. (R. 1-2) On or about August 1, 1990, the Travel Center expanded its 
business. (R. 2 at % 5) The Travel Center switched from retailing Phillips 66 products to 
Texaco. (Id at % 6) The Travel Center purchased Texaco products from Jenkins Oil 
pursuant to an oral agreement. (Id. at f 7) In August, 1991, the Travel Center 
memorialized its oral agreements with Texaco and Jenkins Oil by signing a written 
contract. (Id. at % 10; R. 18-28) Jenkins Oil agreed to provide motor fuel products to the 
Travel Center on credit. (R. 32; R. 3 at % 8) Trout personally guaranteed to pay Jenkins 
Oil for motor fuel products it supplied to the Travel Center. (R. 30) The personal 
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guarantee stated interest would accrue on any unpaid balance at an annual rate of 18%. 
(14) 
Pursuant to its oral and written agreement with the Travel Center, Jenkins Oil 
provided Texaco gas and oil to the Travel Center. (R. 3 at % 8) The Travel Center did not 
pay Jenkins Oil; as of October, 1997, the Travel Center's principal balance due Jenkins 
Oil was $142,606.25. (R. 675) Between October, 1997 and May, 2002, $119,091.58 of 
interest had accrued. (Id.) Thus, two weeks before Judge Mower entered the default 
judgment against the Travel Center and Trout, plaintiffs owed Jenkins Oil a total of 
$261,697.83. (Id) 
B. During Five Years of Pretrial Proceedings, the Court Filed Three 
Notices of Intent to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute, and Trout 
Persistently Terminated His Attorneys on the Eve of Trial 
Judge Mower acted well within his discretion when he sanctioned the Travel 
Center and Trout who spent five years switching lawyers, disobeying court orders, and 
stalling. 
1. The Travel Center and Trout's complaint was filed by attorney Marlin Bates 
on March 10, 1997. (R. 1-32) 
2. A year later, on March 20, 1998, the court filed its first notice of intent to 
dismiss for failure to prosecute. (R. 157) 
3. On March 26, 1998, Trout and the Travel Center appointed their second 
lawyer, Dale Sessions. (R. 159) 
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4. Another year later, on January 20, 1999, the court filed its second notice of 
intent to dismiss for failure to prosecute. (R. 164) 
5. Dale Sessions withdrew as Counsel on January 22, 1999. (R. 166) 
6. On February 4, 1999, Trout and the Travel Center's first attorney Marlin 
Bates filed a Withdrawal of Counsel. (R. 169-70) 
7. After Jenkins Oil filed a notice to appoint a successor attorney, Dale 
Sessions, appellant's second attorney, again filed a notice of appearance on March 29, 
1999. (R. 172;176) 
8. On October 29, 1999, the court ordered that counsel be present at a final 
pretrial conference scheduled for January 6, 2000. (R. 194) 
9. On December 15, 1999, attorney Sessions again withdrew as counsel. 
(R. 208) 
10. On February 3, 2000, the court ordered that plaintiffs obtain new counsel by 
March 1, 2000. Sanctions against plaintiffs were taken under advisement. (R. 650) 
11. On February 28, 2000, plaintiffs' third attorney, Aaron Prisbrey, entered his 
appearance. (R. 215) 
12. On November 17, 2000, the trial court filed its third notice of intent to 
dismiss for failure to prosecute. (R. 217) 
13. On February 1, 2001, plaintiffs' attorney represented that he would be ready 
for trial after April 1, 2001. Pretrial was scheduled for April 26, 2001. Jury trial was set 
for May 18-23, 2001. (R. 234) 
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14. After a failed interlocutory appeal, jury trial was set for December 17, 18, 21, 
2001. (R. 491) 
15. On October 24, 2001, attorney Prisbrey, plaintiffs' third attorney, moved to 
withdraw because he had not been paid. (R. 493) 
16. At a status hearing on November 8, 2001, plaintiffs represented that they 
would be ready for trial in December 2001. (R. 509) 
17. In its November 19, 2001 order granting attorney Prisbrey's motion to 
withdraw, the court noted that it previously warned Trout and the Travel Center that any 
future withdrawal of counsel would be subject to sanctions by the court. (R. 513-14) 
18. On December 4, 2001, attorney Nelson Abbott entered his appearance for 
plaintiffs. (R. 516) 
19. On December 10, 2001, plaintiffs, through Mr. Abbott, moved to continue 
the trial. (R. 520-33) 
20. On December 12, 2001, the court continued the trial date to June 25 - 28, 
2002. (R. 534) 
21. On December 20, 2001, the court sanctioned plaintiffs $7,500.00 for 
attorneys' fees for the delay in causing Jenkins Oil to have to hire new counsel as 
Jenkin's counsel, Scott Burns, was planning to move to Washington, D.C. (R. 577-79) 
22. On May 3, 2002 attorney Burns withdrew as Jenkins Oil's counsel. 
Attorney Andrew Morse replaced attorney Burns as defendant's counsel. (R. 590) 
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23. On May 3, 2002, Mr. Morse filed a Rule 26 Request for Supplementation 
with plaintiffs' counsel. In particular, Jenkins Oil wanted a list of plaintiffs' witnesses 
and exhibits in order to prepare a Pretrial Order. On that same day, Mr. Morse faxed a 
letter to Mr. Nelson Abbott, plaintiffs' counsel, asking for a list of witnesses and exhibits 
in order to prepare a Pretrial Order. (R. 593; R. 662-664) 
24. On May 13, 2002, Jenkins Oil's counsel faxed another letter to Mr. Abbott 
asking him to e-mail any inserts plaintiffs would like to be included in the final Pretrial 
Order that Jenkins Oil's counsel was preparing. (R. 664) 
25. On May 15, 2002, Mr. Morse received a letter from Nelson Abbott, but it 
did not include the requested witnesses and exhibits lists, nor did it include any inserts for 
the Pretrial Order. (R. 666-67) 
26. On May 16, 2002, Mr. Morse faxed another letter to Nelson Abbott 
requesting his participation in drafting the Pretrial Order, and, for the third time, asking 
for a list of witnesses and exhibits. (R. 669) 
27. On Tuesday, May 21, 2002, Nelson Abbott called Mr. Morse and in the 
course of that conversation, refused to supply a list of witnesses and exhibits to be 
included in the Pretrial Order. Mr. Trout was with Mr. Abbott during the course of the 
telephone call. (R. 671-72) 
28. At 8:00 a.m. on May 22, 2002, the day before the final pretrial conference, 
attorney Abbott filed a motion to withdraw as plaintiffs' counsel. (R. 607) 
10 
29. At the pretrial on May 23, 2002, the court granted Mr. Abbott's motion to 
withdraw, leaving Tod's Travel Center, Inc. unrepresented by counsel. (R. 770-71; R. 
799) 
30. The court found John Trout, appearing pro se, produced no witness list or 
exhibit list or exhibits at the pre trial, and he was otherwise unprepared to participate in 
the pre trial or trial. (R. 797 at f 3) 
31. The court found that under Rule 16(d), plaintiffs were unprepared to 
participate in the pretrial conference or trial. (Id. at % 4) 
32. The court further found that at a hearing held in December, 2001, plaintiffs1 
counsel asked for a continuance in order to give him more time to prepare for trial. At 
that time the court warned plaintiffs that if they persisted in these dilatory tactics they 
would be punished with sanctions up to and including the striking of their Complaint and 
their Answer to the Counterclaim, and by the entry of a judgment against them. The court 
found that the plaintiffs repeatedly failed to participate in pretrial conferences and 
proceedings. The court found that the plaintiffs' actions were dilatory, intentional, and 
willful. (Id at <J[ 5) 
33. The court found that the plaintiffs' tactics frustrated the judicial process. 
The court further found that the only appropriate sanction was to strike the plaintiffs' 
Complaint, to strike the plaintiffs' Answer to the defendant's Counterclaim, and to enter a 
default judgment against the plaintiffs, jointly and severally, in the amount of 
$301,769.82 - what plaintiffs owed Jenkins Oil. (Id at % 6) 
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34. The amount of the default judgment was based on the Kelly Johnson 
accounting and the attorneys' fees affidavits and prior sanction order attached to 
defendants' Rule 16(d) Motion for Sanctions. (IdL; R. 674-761; R. 792-93). 
V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
This Court should disregard appellants' brief because it fails to conform to the 
requirements of Rule 24, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. The brief does not state 
where in the record appellants preserved their two issues for appeal, as Rules 24(a)(5)(A-
B) require. The brief incorrectly states the standard of appellate review for the second 
issue, in violation of Rule 24(a)(5), and it does not include record citations, as required by 
Rules 24(a)(7, 9) and 24(e). It is bereft of legal argument, or facts for that matter. 
As such, this Court may justifiably decline to address the two issues Trout and the 
Travel Center raise. Jenkins Oil, however, will address each issue's merits in case this 
Court decides to consider appellants' brief in 'the interests of justice.' 
Judge Mower's order imposing sanctions was warranted and well within the limits 
of his discretion. By repeatedly firing his attorneys on the eve of trial, Trout intentionally 
delayed this case's resolution for over five years. In November, 2001, after three 
'midnight withdrawals' by Trout's attorneys, Judge Mower explicitly warned Trout that 
any future withdrawal of counsel would subject Trout and the Travel Center to sanctions; 
Trout nevertheless fired attorney Nelson Abbott the day before the May 23, 2002 pretrial 
conference. Trout disregarded Judge Mower's warning, and by so doing, invited Judge 
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Mower to declare "enough is enough" and impose sanctions specifically listed in the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Additionally, Judge Mower correctly remained as judge throughout the 
proceedings. This issue is difficult to address because Trout and the Travel Center do not 
state when they raised this issue, how Judge Mower responded, how Judge Mower's 
alleged bias manifested itself, or how his alleged bias and the trial's result are connected. 
The pretrial proceedings unequivocally demonstrate Judge Mower was not biased towards 
Trout and the Travel Center. In fact, Judge Mower repeatedly allowed appellants' 
attorneys to withdraw on the eve of trial, orders potentially prejudicing Jenkins Oil. In 
December, 2001, Judge Mower continued the trial six months so Trout's fourth attorney 
could prepare his case, even though Trout assured the court in November, 2001 that the 
Travel Center would be ready for trial in December. Judge Mower entered these orders, 
and numerous others, at Trout's request and for Trout's benefit. Thus, without additional 
factual information from Trout and the Travel Center, Jenkins Oil fails to see any 
evidence supporting appellants' claim that Judge Mower was biased and should have 
recused himself. 
VI. ARGUMENT 
1. Trout's and the Travel Center's Brief Should Be Stricken or Disregarded 
Because it Does Not Comply with Rule 24, Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure 
This Court may strike or disregard appellants' brief because it fails to conform to 
Rule 24, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Utah's appellate courts have repeatedly 
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stated they "will assume the correctness of the judgment below if the appellant fails to 
make a 'concise statement of the facts and citation of the pages in the record where those 
facts are supported.'" Phillips v. Hatfield, 904 P.2d 1108, 1109 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) 
(quoting Koulis v. Standard Oil Co.. 746 P.2d 1182, 1184 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)).1 
Moreover, it is the Utah Court of Appeals's "prerogative to affirm the lower court 
decision solely on the basis of failure to comply with the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure." West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co.. 818 P.2d 1311, 1313 n.l (Utah Ct. 
App. 1991). 
This Court struck the appellant's brief in Steele v. Bd. of Review of the Indus. 
Comm'nofUtahu 845 P.2d 960, 962 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), because it did "not contain the 
requisite statement of facts. Moreover, [appellant's] cursory statement of the case [did] 
not contain any citations to the record. Likewise, in the argument portion of her brief, 
[appellant] fail[ed] to provide citations to any parts of the record relied upon therein." In 
State v. Price, 827 P.2d 247, 250 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), this Court also disregarded the 
appellant's brief because it was "clearly deficient under the provisions of Rule 24." 
Among other shortcomings, the appellant's brief in Price "fail[ed] to set forth.. .the 
appropriate standard of review for each issue with supporting authority [and]... fail[ed] to 
1
 See also Steele v. Bd. of Review of the Indus. Comm'n of Utah. 845 P.2d 960, 962 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993) ("If a party fails to provide a statement of the facts along with a citation 
to the record where those facts are supported, we will assume the correctness of the 
judgment."); State v. Price, 827 P.2d 247, 249 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) ("We have routinely 
refused to consider arguments which do not include a statement of the facts properly 
supported by citations to the record."). 
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provide a statement of the relevant facts properly documented by citations to the record." 
Id. Additionally, the Price appellant's brief's '"argument' [did] not identify any error by 
the trial court, refer to the facts or the record, or cite applicable authority, much less 
provide any meaningful factual or legal analysis." Id. Thus, Price's appellant's brief did 
"not enable [the appellate court] to locate errors in the record or demonstrate under 
applicable authorities why the errors necessitate^] reversal." Id. (quotations omitted). 
As in Steele and Price, Trout's and the Travel Center's brief does not contain a 
statement of the facts supported by citations to the record. See Appellant's Br. at 3-4. 
Both its cursory statement of the case and its argument section are void of record 
citations, see id. at 2-3, 5-8, and it fails to set forth the correct standard of review for the 
second issue. See id. at 2. Appellants' brief also incorrectly states which Utah Code 
section confers jurisdiction on this Court. See id. at 1. Trout and the Travel Center's 
brief does not "enable" Jenkins Oil or this Court "to locate errors in the record or 
demonstrate under applicable authorities why the errors necessitate reversal[,]" Price, 
827 P.2d at 250. Thus, Jenkins Oil asks the Court to disregard or strike appellants' brief, 
affirm the trial court's judgment, and award attorney fees under Rule 24(j), Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. Jenkins Oil, however, recognizes Utah's appellate courts "are not 
obligated to strike or disregard a marginal or inadequate brief[;]" since this Court may 
"choose to further address [appellants'] arguments in the interests of justice[,]" Jenkins 
Oil will therefore brief both issues Trout and the Travel Center raise. State v. Gamblin. 
2000 UT 44, f 8 , 1 R3d 1108. 
15 
2. Trout's Appeal Is Frivolous, and this Court Should Award Jenkins Oil 
Attorney Fees under Rule 33(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
Trout's brief is "not grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, or not based 
on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or reverse existing law[.]" It is therefore 
frivolous under Rule 33(b), Utah R. App. P. Jenkins Oil therefore requests this Court 
award it reasonable attorney fees as provided in Rule 33(a), Utah R. App. P. 
"Under Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 33, a party is entitled to attorney fees 
when an 'appeal...is...frivolous...[A] frivolous appeal...is one that is not grounded in fact, 
not warranted by existing law, or not based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, 
or reverse existing law.'" Warner v. DMG Color, Inc., 2000 UT 102, f 24, 20 P.3d 686 
(quoting Utah R. App. P. 33(a), (b)). This Court previously stated "[sjanctions are 
appropriate for appeals 'obviously without merit, with no reasonable likelihood of 
success, and which result in the delay of a proper judgment.'" Farrell v. Porter, 830 P.2d 
299, 302 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (quoting Maughan v. Maughan, 770 P.2d 156, 162 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989)). This Court has also ruled that "sanctions should be imposed when 'an 
appeal is obviously without any merit and has been taken with no reasonable likelihood of 
prevailing, and results in delayed implementation of the judgment of the lower court; 
increased costs of litigation; and dissipation of the time and resources of the Law Court.'" 
Porco v. Porco, 752 P.2d 365, 369 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (quoting Auburn Harpswell 
Ass'n v.Dav, 438 A.2d 234, 239 (Me. 1981)). 
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Utah's appellate courts have found appeals to be frivolous when "[t]he record is 
devoid of any relevant, admissible evidence" supporting an appellant's arguments, Hunt 
v. Hurst 785 P.2d 414, 416 (Utah 1990), or when there is a "total lack of basis in fact for 
the claims against" an appellee. Gildea v. Guardian Title Co. of Utah, 970 P.2d 1265, 
1272 (Utah 1998). Similarly, this Court has said an appeal that is "merely a continuation 
of plaintiff's efforts to harass defendant" is also frivolous. Porco, 752 P.2d at 369. 
Trout's brief cites no relevant, admissible evidence in support of his claims. It is 
without merit and has no reasonable likelihood of success. The total lack of basis in fact 
for the issues Trout appeals suggests that it is a continuation of Trout's five-year 
campaign to harass Jenkins Oil, and avoid the debt. Jenkins Oil should be awarded its 
attorney fees incurred in preparing its appellee brief. 
Jenkins Oil "recognize[s] that sanctions for frivolous appeals should only be 
applied in egregious cases[.]" Id The undisputable lack of factual support for Trout's 
claims and his incessant dilatory behavior suggest this case fits squarely within those 
parameters. As such, an order under Rule 33, Utah R. App. P, awarding Jenkins Oil its 
attorney fees is entirely appropriate. 
3. Judge Mower's Order Sanctioning Trout and the Travel Center under Rules 
16(d) and 31(b)(2)(C\ Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Was Well Within His 
Discretion 
Trout and the Travel Center fired their fourth attorney on May 22, 2002, the day 
before the final pretrial conference, despite Judge Mower's November 19, 2001 warning 
that the "future withdrawal of counsel would be subject to sanctions by the court." 
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(R. 513-14) Because Trout's actions left corporate plaintiff Tod's Travel Center, Inc. 
"unrepresented by counsel[,]" (R. 797 at <J[ 2), and because pro se plaintiff Trout did not 
produce a "witness list or exhibit list or exhibits at the pre trial" (Id. at f 3), the trial court 
found that, "[u]nder Rule 16(d), plaintiffs were unprepared to participate in the pre trial or 
trial." (Id. at f 4) The trial court also found Trout's actions were "dilatory[,]... 
intentional and willful" and that Trout's "tactics have frustrated the judicial process." (Id. 
at ff 5-6) Trout disregarded Judge Mower's warning and failed to comply with Rule 
16(d), Utah R. Civ. P. Accordingly, the trial court sanctioned appellants as allowed in 
Rule 37(b)(2)(C) by striking their complaint and answer to counter-claim and entering a 
default judgment against them. (See R. 800 at ff 3-4) These actions were well within 
Judge Mower's discretion. 
The facts indicate willful dilatory conduct. Trout repeatedly engaged in bad faith, 
persistent, dilatory tactics that frustrated the judicial process for more than five years. 
Just one day before the finial pretrial conference, Trout again fired his lawyer for the 
fourth time. (See R. 607) As the trial court stated, "enough is enough." (R.1021 at 23.) 
Trout repeatedly switched lawyers in order to delay trial, refused to participate in the 
preparation of Pretrial Orders, and was substantially unprepared to participate in each and 
every pretrial conference before the trial court, all in an attempt to avoid a judgment. 
Justice demands that this type of behavior be sanctioned, and Trout's conduct shows 
Judge Mower acted within the "limits of reasonability" when he sanctioned Trout and the 
Travel Center. Tolman, 912 P.2d at 462. Moreover, appellants themselves note "it is 
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plain and clear that entering a default judgment is within the authority of the Court." 
Appellants' Br. at 5. 
In appellants' brief, they assert Trout had in his possession at the pretrial 
conference the witness list and trial exhibit list needed and would have provided them, 
but for some unknown reason his attorney openly refused his direct order to turn the list 
over to Jenkins Oil Company. Appellants' Br. at 6. Mr. Trout's story is unbelievable. 
Without getting into Mr. Trout's unusual story the question still remains: Where is this 
list? To this day, Jenkins Oil Company has never received a witness or exhibit list. 
The truth is probably better represented by the Court's findings of fact in this case. 
The Court found that Trout, "appearing pro se, produced no witness list or exhibit list or 
exhibits at the pretrial" and that he was "unprepared to participate in the pretrial or trial." 
(R. 797 at 1 3) The court twice gave Trout one last chance to come to court prepared for 
trial. (Id. at % 5) The last one was given in December 2001. (Id.) Trout was ordered to 
stop his dilatory tactics and to participate in pretrial conferences and to come to 
proceedings prepared to move forward. (Id.) Trout willfully failed to comply with these 
orders, in order to avoid the debt he owed Jenkins Oil. 
To support a finding of willfulness, there need only be "any intentional failure as 
distinguished from involuntary non-compliance. No wrongful intent need be shown. 
Tuck v. Godfrey. 981 P.2d 407, 411 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). Once the threshold is met, the 
choice of an appropriate sanction is primarily the responsibility of the trial court. Morton 
v. Continental Baking Co., 938 P.2d 271, 274 (Utah 1997). Here the record is replete with 
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repeated intentional dilatory tactics. Trout sought three delays to get another lawyer to 
take the case and prepare for trial. The court was very patient with Trout, repeatedly 
giving him the benefit of the doubt and allowing him yet more time to get another lawyer 
and prepare for trial. Yet despite these allowances Trout once again failed to comply with 
the Court's order and on the day of the final pretrial, he was once again not prepared, nor 
had he made any effort to prepare. 
Rule 16(d) states, "if a party or party's attorney is substantially unprepared to 
participate in the [pretrial] conference, or if a party or party's attorney fails to participate 
in good faith, the court, upon motion or its own initiative, may make such orders with 
regard thereto as are just, in among others, any of the orders provided in Rule 
37(b)(2)(B)(C), (D)." Utah R. Civ. P. 16(d). Trout's conduct fits squarely within the 
parameter of Rule 16(d). Trout was repeatedly and intentionally "substantially 
unprepared to participate in the [pretrial] conference." He failed repeatedly and 
intentionally to participate in the pretrial "in good faith." The court correctly entered 
sanctions under Rule 37(b)(2)(C) by striking his complaint, striking his answer to the 
counterclaim, and entering a judgment equal to the amounts owing. 
The sanction in this case were not unusual. Utah law is replete with instances like 
this one where courts dismiss a claim or strike an answer for behavior less egregious than 
Trout's behavior. See, e.g., Gorostieta v. Parkinson, 2000 UT 99, 17 P.3d 1110; Tuck v. 
Godfrey. 981 P.2d 407, 411 (Utah Ct. App. 1999); Hails v. Oldrovd. 2000 UT App 75, 
999 P.2d 588; Preston & Chambers, P.C. v. Roller. 943 P.2d 260 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
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Trout was ordered to stop his dilatory tactics, participate in pretrial conferences, 
and to come to proceedings prepared to move forward. (R. 797 at f 5) Trout failed to 
comply with these orders and instead willfully persisted in refusing to provide witness 
and/or exhibit lists, continued to come to court unprepared, and fired his attorney fourth 
attorney on the eve of trial. These facts show the court acted within its sound discretion 
when it sanctioned Trout and put an end to his inexcusable behavior. 
4. Judge Mower Followed the Code of Judicial Conduct Guidelines When He 
Heard the Case 
A. This Issue Should Be Disregarded Because Trout's Brief Does Not 
Show, and Jenkins Oil Could Not Find, Where in the Record Trout 
Preserved This Issue for Appeal 
Before addressing this issue's merits, Jenkins Oil notes appellants' brief did not, as 
Rules 24(a)(5)(A-B), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure require, provide a "citation to 
the record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial court; or a statement of 
grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved in the trial court." Since Trout and 
the Travel Center neglected to include this citation, Jenkins Oil independently reviewed 
the record to determine whether Trout preserved this issue for appeal. Jenkins Oil's 
search was unsuccessful. It appears this issue was not preserved in the trial court. 
Utah appellate jurisprudence clearly states "issues not raised at trial cannot be 
argued for the first time on appeal." Diversified Holdings, L.C. v. Turner, 2002 UT 129, 
f 8, 63 P.3d 686 (quoting Monson v. Carver, 928 P.2d 1017, 1022 (Utah 1996)). See also 
Taghipour v. Jerez, 2001 UT App 139, % 18, 26 P.3d 885; Ellis v. Swensen, 2000 UT 101, 
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<j[ 30, 16 P.3d 1233; State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, f 11, 10 P.3d 346. Because Trout and 
the Travel Center did not indicate how they preserved this issue in the trial court, Jenkins 
Oil urges this Court to disregard this portion of appellants' brief. 
B. Judge Mower Acted Within the Scope of Utah's Code of Judicial 
Conduct When He Heard the Case 
Without citing any facts that show an indication of bias, Trout and the Travel 
Center argue Judge Mower should have recused himself from the case because he 
"represented one of the Plaintiffs in a civil action prior to being appointed to the bench." 
Appellant's Br. at 8. Appellants further contend "it doesn't [sic] matter" whether this 
"relationship create[d] a personal bias or prejudice between Judge Mower and the 
Plaintiff because "[w]hat matters is whether that relationship might reasonably have 
created circumstances indicating bias or prejudice." Id. This argument contradicts Utah 
precedent and is without merit. 
"Determining whether a trial judge committed error by failing to recuse himself or 
herself under the Utah Code of Judicial Conduct.. .and our accompanying case law is a 
question of law, and [appellate courts] review such questions for correctness." State v. 
Alonzo, 973 P.2d 975, 979 (Utah 1998). See also State v. Tueller. 2001 UT App 317, % 7, 
37P.3dl l80. 
Initially, Jenkins Oil notes the difficulty it faces addressing this issue because 
appellants' argument lacks a procedural or factual foundation. While Utah precedent is 
replete with cases reviewing a judge's failure to recuse himself or herself, those cases all 
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stem from a judge's actual denial of one party's formal request for disqualification.2 
Here, the record does not reveal Trout filed any motion, Rule 63(b) affidavit, or other 
formal or informal request that Judge Mower recuse himself. As such, neither Judge 
Mower nor his colleagues addressed the legal sufficiency of Trout's bias claim; thus, this 
Court must attempt to address the alleged impropriety of Judge Mower's inaction. 
Additionally, appellants misconstrue the Code of Judicial Conduct's provisions 
that govern disqualification as requiring "only circumstances indicating questionable 
impartiality" and mischaracterize the Code's provisions as "a very low threshold." 
Appellants' Br. at 8 (emphasis added). The Code directs that "a judge shall enter a 
disqualification in a proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be 
questioned[.]" Utah Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3E(1) (emphasis added). This 
Court previously determined that "Utah courts have not specifically interpreted the 
'impartiality might reasonably be questioned' language of this canon" but that federal 
courts have interpreted similar language "in discussing the standard for determining 
whether a judge's recusal is required under the federal counterpart to the Utah rule, 28 
2
 See, e.g.. Treff v. Hinckley, 2001 UT 50, f|[ 7-10, 26 P.3d 212 (reviewing judge's 
denial of two motions to disqualify); State v. West, 2001 UT App 275, 34 P.3d 234 (granting 
in part and denying in part extraordinary writ, under Rule 65B, Utah R. Civ. P., and Rule 19, 
Utah R. App. P., compelling one district judge to order another to disqualify himself); 
American Rural Cellular, Inc. v. Systems Communication Corp., 939 P.2d 185,193-96 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1997) (reviewing denial of motion to disqualify); State v. Alonzo, 973 P.2d 975, 
978-80 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (reviewing denial of Rule 29, Utah R. Crim. P., motion to 
disqualify); In re Affidavit of Bias, 947 P.2d 1152, 1154 (Utah 1997) (Zimmerman, C.J., 
sitting alone) (reviewing legal sufficiency of affidavit of bias under Rule 63(b), Utah R. Civ. 
P.); State in the Interest of M.L., 965 P.2d 551, 556-57 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (same). 
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U.S.C.A. § 455(a) (1993)." American Rural Cellular, Inc. v. Systems Communication 
Corp., 939 P.2d 185, 195 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). Citing federal decisions, this Court said 
"whether recusal is required does not depend on whether or not the judge actually knew 
of facts creating an appearance of impropriety; instead, recusal is required if a reasonable 
person, knowing all the circumstances, would expect that the judge would have actual 
knowledge." IcL (citations omitted). This Court also described "the types of 
circumstances" that federal courts have said "warrant recusal[,]" including "when a judge 
has a direct personal or fiduciary interest in the outcome of the case, regardless of 
whether or not the judge is actually aware of that interest at the relevant times." Id. at 
195-96 (citations omitted). If, however, "a case...involves remote, contingent, indirect or 
speculative interests, disqualification is not required." Id. at 196 (citations omitted). 
This construction of Canon 3E's "impartiality might reasonably be questioned" 
language is in harmony with the requirement this Court imposed on Rule 63(b) bias 
affidavits; namely, "that the bias alleged in the affidavit 'have some basis in fact and be 
grounded on more than mere conjecture and speculation.'" State in the Interest of M.L., 
965 P.2d at 556 (quoting Madsen v. Prudential Fed. Sav. & Loan, 767 P.2d 538, 544 n. 5 
(Utah 1988)). "Furthermore, such bias may not be based solely on the fact that the judge 
has issued prior rulings adverse to the party making the allegation." Id. See also In re 
Affidavit of Bias, 947 P.2d at 1154 ("no deduction of bias and prejudice may be made 
from adverse rulings by a judge") (quoting 46 Am.Jur.2d Judges § 219 (1994)). 
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These cases make clear the error in appellants' reasoning. Rather than the "low 
threshold" appellant claims, the Code of Judicial Conduct requires disqualification only 
when there are concrete facts that reasonably create the appearance of bias. State in the 
Interest of M.L., 965 P.2d at 566; American Rural Cellular, 939 P.2d at 195-96. Remote, 
speculative, contingent, and indirect interests do not require disqualification, and 
allegations of bias may not be based solely on adverse rulings. Id.; In re Affidavit of 
Bias, 947 P.2d at 1154. 
In light of this precedent, Judge Mower's conduct conformed to the Code of 
Judicial Conduct's requirements, and he correctly presided over this case. Appellants 
have not cited any factual evidence supporting their claim of bias. Any relationship Judge 
Mower developed during prior representation of one of the appellants3 is indirect and 
remote from this case, and its possible effect on the proceedings, if any, can only be 
classified as speculative. Moreover, Judge Mower had no fiduciary interest in this case. 
As such, appellants' claim should be dismissed. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Because appellants' brief does not comply with Rule 24, Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, this Court should summarily affirm the trial court's rulings and award Jenkins 
Oil its attorney fees as provided in Rule 24(j). Moreover, Trout's and the Travel Center's 
3
 Appellants do not state which plaintiff Judge Mower previously represented. See 
Appellants' Br. at 7-8. 
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appeal is frivolous. This Court should therefore award Jenkins Oil its attorney fees under 
Rule 33(a), Utah R. App. P. 
Judge Mower's order sanctioning Trout and the Travel Center under Rules 16(d) 
and 37(b)(2)(C), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, was both warranted and well within his 
discretion. Appellants' willfully disregarded Judge Mower's warning and engaged in 
dilatory tactics, all to Jenkins Oil's prejudice. Enough is enough; the trial court's 
sanctions should be affirmed. 
Additionally, Judge Mower obeyed both the spirit and the letter of Utah's Code of 
Judicial Conduct when he heard the case. Any relationship between Judge Mower and 
one of the plaintiffs was distant and not central to this trial; any alleged effect Judge 
Mower's prior representation had on this case is factually unsupported and speculative. 
This issue should be disregarded. 
Respectfully submitted this day of July, 2003. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTNEAU 
Andrew M. Morse 
N\2I422\l\Appeal~l wpd 
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